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Americans Give Early Trump Foreign Policy Actions Mixed or Negative Reviews

More Americans see the president favoring Russia too much than striking the right balance

BY *Laura Silver, Jordan Lippert and Andrew Prozorovsky*

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How we did this

Pew Research Center conducted this study to gauge Americans' views of the second Trump administration's earliest foreign policy actions. The issues covered in this report include withdrawing from global agreements, ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, trade and tariffs, and U.S. territorial expansion. This analysis builds on the Center's previous study of Americans' opinions on the most pressing foreign policy issues of the day going back decades, such as on [major world conflicts](#), [trade and tariffs](#), [U.S. military decisions](#) and [other related developments of the times](#).

For this analysis, we surveyed 3,605 U.S. adults from March 24 to 30, 2025. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center's American Trends Panel (ATP), a group of people recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses who have agreed to take surveys regularly. This kind of recruitment gives nearly all U.S. adults a chance of selection. Surveys were conducted either online or by telephone with a live interviewer. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the [ATP's methodology](#).

Here are the [questions used for this analysis](#), along with [responses](#), and its [methodology](#).

Americans Give Early Trump Foreign Policy Actions Mixed or Negative Reviews

More Americans see the president favoring Russia too much than striking the right balance

President Donald Trump is pursuing a markedly different foreign policy strategy than former President Joe Biden. He has [withdrawn the United States from international agreements](#), is [working more closely with Russia](#) to end the war in Ukraine, has [discussed taking over foreign territory](#) and has [imposed tariffs on trade partners](#).


Many of these early foreign policy actions receive mixed or negative reviews from Americans, according to a survey of 3,605 adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.

For example, more Americans disapprove than approve of the U.S.:

- Leaving the World Health Organization
- Leaving the Paris Climate Agreement
- Ending most U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs

More Americans disapprove than approve of ending USAID and leaving the WHO, Paris Climate Agreement

% of U.S. adults who ___ of the U.S. ...



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.
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Russia and Ukraine, Israelis and Palestinians


Many Americans also don't see Trump's handling of the Russia-Ukraine relationship as balanced: **A 43% plurality says he is favoring Russia too much.** Roughly three-in-ten say he's striking about the right balance between Russia and Ukraine and 3% say he's favoring Ukraine too much. Another 22% are unsure.

We also asked the public's opinion on whether Trump is striking the right balance when it comes to U.S. relations with Israelis and Palestinians. Here, opinions are more mixed.

Similar shares see him favoring the Israelis too much (31%) and striking the right balance (29%), with 37% unsure and 3% saying he's favoring the Palestinians too much. (The survey was conducted prior to Netanyahu's April visit to the U.S.)

43% say Trump is favoring Russia too much – but Americans are more divided about Israelis and Palestinians

% of U.S. adults who say Donald Trump is ...



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.

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Greenland and Gaza

Americans are divided over how likely it is that Trump will pursue the U.S. [taking over Greenland or Gaza](#). Around one-in-five Americans think Trump is extremely or very likely to pursue taking over Greenland or Gaza, with more saying these actions are not too or not at all likely.


Still, by more than a two-to-one margin, Americans oppose rather than favor the U.S. taking over these territories.

More Republicans support (41%) than oppose (28%) Trump's proposal to take over


Greenland, though around three-in-ten (31%) are unsure. But, **in the case of taking over Gaza, more Republicans oppose (44%) than support (27%) the idea.**

Americans have mixed predictions of how likely the Trump administration is to pursue takeovers of Gaza, Greenland – but majorities oppose doing so

% of U.S. adults who say it is ___ likely that Trump will pursue taking over ...



% of U.S. adults who ___ the U.S. taking over ...



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.

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Tariffs on China

Tariffs are [another key part of Trump’s foreign policy](#).

Increased tariffs on China, specifically, receive more negative than positive evaluations. (The survey predated [the detailed announcement of widespread global tariffs](#) – including further tariffs on China – on April 2, as well as [China’s retaliatory response](#). But Trump [had already increased tariffs on China](#) before the survey was fielded.)

Many more think the increased tariffs on China will be bad for the U.S. than say they will be good,


though around a quarter either see them having no effect or are unsure.

Views of the tariffs’ personal impact are similarly negative: **Americans are about five times as likely to say the increased tariffs on China will be bad for them as they are to say the tariffs will be beneficial.**

Republicans are more likely than Democrats to say increased tariffs on China will be good for the U.S. and good for them personally. Still, when it comes to the personal impact of these tariffs, Republicans are more likely to say the impact will be bad (30%) than good (17%), even as substantial shares express uncertainty or anticipate the tariffs will have limited personal impact.

Americans tend to say tariffs on China will be bad for the U.S. and for them personally

% who say increased tariffs on China will be (have) ___ for ...



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.
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Jump ahead to read about views on:

- [The U.S. withdrawing from the WHO and Paris Climate Agreement, ending most USAID programs](#)
- [How Trump is handling relations with Russia and Ukraine](#)
- [How Trump is handling relations with Israelis and Palestinians](#)
- [The U.S. pursuing a takeover of Greenland](#)
- [The U.S. pursuing a takeover of Gaza](#)
- [Increasing tariffs on China](#)


The U.S. withdrawing from the WHO and Paris Climate Agreement, ending most USAID programs

Within the first days of his second administration, Trump moved to withdraw the U.S. from both the [World Health Organization \(WHO\)](#) and the [Paris Climate Agreement](#). The administration also took [action to end most activities of the U.S. Agency for International Development \(USAID\)](#).

Each of these policies are more unpopular than not, though the share saying they are unsure ranges from 16% to 22%.

Republicans express more approval of some early Trump foreign policy moves than do Democrats

% who **approve** of the U.S. doing each of the following, by party



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.
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Views by party

- 64% of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents support **ending most USAID programs**, compared with 9% of Democrats and Democratic leaners.
- 60% of Republicans support the **U.S. leaving the Paris Climate Agreement**; 7% of Democrats say the same.
- 58% of Republicans support the **U.S. leaving the WHO**, as do 8% of Democrats.

For each of these policies, Republicans are also more likely than Democrats to say they are unsure.

Views by age


Generally, older adults are more likely to approve of Trump’s early foreign policy actions than younger adults.

For example, around four-in-ten Americans ages 50 and older approve of the U.S. leaving the Paris Climate Agreement, compared with 32% of those ages 30 to 49 and 24% of those under 30. (Younger adults are also more likely to say they are unsure.)

Older Republicans are particularly likely to approve of these policy actions, relative to younger ones, while age differences among Democrats are more muted.

Older Americans are more supportive of some early Trump foreign policy actions than are younger adults

% who **approve** of the U.S. doing each of the following, by age



Note: All differences shown are statistically significant.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.
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
How Trump is handling relations with Russia and Ukraine

Since taking office, Trump has actively pursued a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine. His approach, which differs sharply from Biden's, has included [phone calls with Putin](#), temporarily [suspending military aid to Ukraine](#), and a [tense Oval Office meeting](#) with Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

A plurality of Americans see Trump favoring Russia too much (43%). Fewer say he's striking about the right balance (31%), and only 3% say he's favoring Ukraine too much. Roughly one-in-five are unsure.

Plurality of Americans say Trump is favoring Russia too much

% who say Donald Trump is ...



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.
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Views by party

Republicans largely approve of Trump's handling of the conflict: 57% say he's striking the right balance, while 16% say he's favoring Russia too much. Just 3% say that he's favoring Ukraine too much, and about a quarter are unsure.

Around three-quarters of Democrats (72%) think Trump is favoring Russia too much, with few saying he's striking the right balance (7%) or favoring Ukraine too much (2%). Around one-in-five are unsure.

How Trump is handling relations with Israelis and Palestinians

While few Americans think Trump is favoring the Palestinians too much (3%), they are otherwise fairly divided about whether he's striking about the right balance between Israelis and Palestinians (29%) or favoring the Israelis too much (31%). More than a third (37%) are unsure.


For comparison, last July, Biden was about equally likely to be seen as favoring Israelis too much (21%) and favoring Palestinians too much (20%), with another 18% saying he was striking the right balance (and 40% unsure).

Views by party

At least a third in each partisan coalition are unsure about Trump's handling of these Middle Eastern relationships. But whereas about half of Republicans think Trump is striking the right balance (51%), a similar share of Democrats (50%) think he's favoring Israelis too much.

Americans offer mixed assessments of Trump's handling of relations with Israelis and Palestinians

% who say Donald Trump is ...



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.
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
The U.S. pursuing a takeover of Greenland

Trump has [issued multiple calls for the U.S. to control Greenland](#). While the survey was in the field, Vice President JD Vance visited the island; Trump made [additional statements](#) about taking over Greenland after Vance’s visit.

Americans, however, are split over whether Trump will pursue trying to take over Greenland. Around a third (34%) say he is either not too or not at all likely to pursue the policy, with 28% saying it’s somewhat likely and 23% describing it as extremely or very likely (14% are unsure).

Majority oppose the U.S. taking over Greenland

% who ___ the U.S. taking over Greenland



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.
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Americans don’t support the U.S. taking over Greenland: 54% oppose it, including 43% who *strongly* oppose it. Around a quarter (23%) favor the move, with another 22% saying they are unsure.

Views by party

Republicans and Democrats are equally likely to think Trump will *pursue* taking over the island territory. But Republicans are much more likely to favor the policy than Democrats (41% vs. 6%). Still, Republicans are somewhat internally divided, with 28% opposing and 31% unsure.

Among Democrats, opposition is widespread: 81% oppose the measure, including 70% who *strongly* oppose it.


The U.S. pursuing a takeover of Gaza

In February, during a joint news conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Trump proposed [the U.S. taking over the Gaza Strip](#), potentially resettling Palestinians elsewhere.

As is the case with the prospect of the U.S. taking over Greenland, a sizable share of Americans do not think it's likely Trump will pursue this policy: 38% say it's either not too or not at all likely, 26% say it's somewhat likely, and 20% say it's extremely or very likely. Another 16% are unsure.

More in both parties oppose than support the U.S. taking over Gaza

% who ___ the U.S. taking over Gaza



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.
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Around six-in-ten Americans (62%) oppose the U.S. taking over Gaza, including 49% who *strongly* oppose it. Another 22% are unsure, while 15% favor it.

Views by party

Republicans are somewhat more likely than Democrats to say it's unlikely Trump will try to take over Gaza (43% vs. 34%).

Republicans (27%) are also more likely than Democrats (5%) to favor this move, though pluralities in both parties oppose it. More than four-in-ten Republicans (44%) oppose the U.S. taking over Gaza, while another 28% are unsure. Democrats are fairly united in their opposition, with 80% saying they oppose the measure, including 72% who *strongly* oppose it.

Increasing tariffs on China

While various tariffs on other countries [were threatened and sometimes delayed](#), Trump did [increase tariffs](#) against China in March, before the survey was fielded. (Since the survey concluded, [he has announced additional tariffs on China](#) and many other countries around the globe).

Around half of Americans (52%) anticipate this change will be bad for the U.S. and a nearly identical share (53%) say they will be bad for them personally.

Around a quarter of Americans (24%) think the increased tariffs on China will be good for the country. About half as many (10%) think they will be good for them personally.

Roughly one-in-five Americans are unsure about the potential impact of these tariffs, both on the country and their own lives. When it comes to their own lives, some say these tariffs will have no effect either way (17%). Fewer (6%) say the same about how they will impact the U.S.


Views by party

Republicans and GOP leaners are much more likely than

Democrats and Democratic leaners to say that the increased tariffs on imported goods from China will be good for the U.S. (44% vs. 5%). They are also about twice as likely to say they are unsure (24% vs. 11%) and slightly more likely to say they will have no real effect either way (8% vs. 3%).

Republicans are more likely than Democrats to say increased tariffs on China will be beneficial for the country and for them personally

% who say increased tariffs on China will be (have) ___ for ...



Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 24-30, 2025.

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Democrats, for their part, are fairly united in their view that the increased tariffs on China will be bad for the U.S.: 80% say this.

When it comes to the *personal* impact of tariffs, Republicans are also more likely than Democrats to say tariffs will be good (17% vs. 4%). But, **on balance, Republicans are more likely to say increased tariffs on China will be bad for them personally than to say they will be good (30% vs. 17%)**. Still, about half of Republicans say they anticipate the tariffs will have no real effect either way on them personally (27%) or that they are unsure (26%).

A wide majority of Democrats think the tariffs will harm their own lives: **75% of Democrats say the tariffs will be bad for them personally**. Another 13% are unsure, 8% anticipate no real effect either way, and 4% say they will be good.

Among Republicans, those under 50 are more likely than those ages 50 and older to say the tariffs will be bad for them personally (36% vs. 23%). Among Democrats, views on the tariffs' personal effects do not differ significantly across age groups.

Acknowledgments

This report is a collaborative effort based on the input and analysis of the following individuals.

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Methodology

The American Trends Panel survey methodology

Overview

Data in this report comes from Wave 166 of the American Trends Panel (ATP), Pew Research Center’s nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. The survey was conducted from March 24 to March 30, 2025. A total of 3,605 panelists responded out of 4,045 who were sampled, for a survey-level response rate of 89%.

The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,605 respondents is plus or minus 1.9 percentage points.

The survey includes [oversample](#) of Jewish, Muslim and non-Hispanic Asian adults in order to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population.

SSRS conducted the survey for Pew Research Center via online (n=3,460) and live telephone (n=145) interviewing. Interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish.

To learn more about the ATP, read “[About the American Trends Panel.](#)”

Panel recruitment

Since 2018, the ATP has used address-based sampling (ABS) for recruitment. A study cover letter and a pre-incentive are mailed to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service’s Computerized Delivery Sequence File. This Postal Service file has been estimated to cover 90% to 98% of the population.¹ Within each sampled household, the adult with the next birthday is selected to participate. Other details of the ABS recruitment protocol have changed over time but are available upon request.² Prior to 2018, the ATP was recruited using landline and cellphone random-digit-dial surveys administered in English and Spanish.

¹ AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. “[AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling.](#)”

² Email pewsurveys@pewresearch.org.

A national sample of U.S. adults has been recruited to the ATP approximately once per year since 2014. In some years, the recruitment has included additional efforts (known as an “oversample”) to improve the accuracy of data for underrepresented groups. For example, Hispanic adults, Black adults and Asian adults were oversampled in 2019, 2022 and 2023, respectively.

Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was noninstitutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the United States. It featured a stratified random sample from the ATP in which Jewish, Muslim and non-Hispanic Asian adults were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with SSRS. The web program used for online respondents was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the SSRS project team and Pew Research Center researchers. The SSRS project team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or gift code to Amazon.com, Target.com or Walmart.com. Incentive amounts ranged from \$5 to \$20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was March 24 to March 30, 2025. Surveys were conducted via self-administered web survey or by live telephone interviewing.

For panelists who take surveys online:³ Postcard notifications were mailed to a subset on March 24.⁴ Survey invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on March 24. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled online panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on March 25.

**Invitation and reminder dates for web respondents,
ATP Wave 166**

	Soft launch	Full launch
Initial invitation	March 24, 2025	March 25, 2025
First reminder	March 27, 2025	March 27, 2025
Final reminder	March 29, 2025	March 29, 2025

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Panelists participating online were sent an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages were sent an SMS invitation with a link to the survey and up to two SMS reminders.

For panelists who take surveys over the phone with a live interviewer: Prenotification postcards were mailed on March 21. Soft launch took place on March 24 and involved dialing until a total of five interviews had been completed. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled phone panelists' numbers were dialed throughout the remaining field period. Panelists who take surveys via phone can receive up to six calls from trained SSRS interviewers.

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, Center researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for whether respondents left questions blank at very high rates or always selected the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, three ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

³ The ATP does not use routers or chains in any part of its online data collection protocol, nor are they used to direct respondents to additional surveys.

⁴ Postcard notifications for web panelists are sent to 1) panelists who were recruited within the last two years and 2) panelists recruited prior to the last two years who opt to continue receiving postcard notifications.

Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the panel survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of recruitment into the panel. These weights are then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

American Trends Panel weighting dimensions

Variable	Benchmark source
Age (detailed)	2023 American Community Survey (ACS)
Age x Gender	
Education x Gender	
Education x Age	
Race/Ethnicity x Education	
Race/Ethnicity x Gender	
Race/Ethnicity x Age	
Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among Hispanics and Asian Americans	
Years lived in the U.S.	
Census region x Metropolitan status	
Volunteerism	2023 CPS Volunteering & Civic Life Supplement
Voter registration	2020 CPS Voting and Registration Supplement
Frequency of internet use	2024 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS)
Religious affiliation	
Party affiliation x Race/Ethnicity	
Party affiliation x Age	
Party affiliation among registered voters	

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on noninstitutionalized adults. Voter registration is calculated using procedures from Hur, Achen (2013) and rescaled to include the total U.S. adult population.

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The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Sample sizes and margins of error, ATP Wave 166

Group	Unweighted sample size	Plus or minus ...
Total sample	3,605	1.9 percentage points
Form 1	1,804	2.7 percentage points
Form 2	1,801	2.6 percentage points
Rep/Lean Rep	1,586	2.7 percentage points
Dem/Lean Dem	1,909	2.7 percentage points

Note: This survey includes oversamples of Jewish, Muslim, and non-Hispanic Asian respondents. Unweighted sample sizes do not account for the sample design or weighting and do not describe a group's contribution to weighted estimates. See the Sample design and Weighting sections above for details.

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Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates

Final dispositions, ATP Wave 166

	AAPOR code	Total
Completed interview	1.1	3,605
Logged in (web) / Contacted (CATI), but did not complete any items	2.11	65
Started survey; broke off before completion	2.12	25
Never logged on (web) / Never reached on phone (CATI)	2.20	346
Survey completed after close of the field period	2.27	0
Other non-interview	2.30	1
Completed interview but was removed for data quality	2.90	3
Total panelists sampled for the survey		4,045
Completed interviews	I	3,605
Partial interviews	P	0
Refusals	R	90
Non-contact	NC	346
Other	O	4
Unknown household	UH	0
Unknown other	UO	0
Not eligible	NE	0
Total		4,045
$AAPOR\ RR1 = I / (I+P+R+NC+O+UH+UO)$		89%

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Cumulative response rate, ATP Wave 166

	Total
Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys	11%
% of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to join the panel, among those invited	73%
% of those agreeing to join who were active panelists at start of Wave 166	35%
Response rate to Wave 166 survey	89%
Cumulative response rate	3%

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Topline questionnaire

Pew Research Center
Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey
April 8, 2025, release

Methodological notes:

- Survey results are based on national samples. For further details on sample designs, refer to the [Methodology section](#).
- Due to rounding, percentages may not total 100%. The Topline “total” columns show 100% because they are based on unrounded numbers.
- The U.S. survey was conducted on Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel.
- Not all questions included in the Spring 2025 Global Attitudes Survey are presented in this Topline. Omitted questions will be released in future reports.

		TRUMP_POLICY_WHO. Do you approve of each of the following? The U.S. ... Leaving the World Health Organization, or WHO								
		TOTAL Approve	TOTAL Disapprove	Strongly approve	Somewhat approve	Somewhat disapprove	Strongly disapprove	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	32	52	20	12	15	37	16	0	100

		TRUMP_POLICY_PARIS. Do you approve of each of the following? The U.S. ... Leaving the Paris climate agreement								
		TOTAL Approve	TOTAL Disapprove	Strongly approve	Somewhat approve	Somewhat disapprove	Strongly disapprove	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	32	46	21	11	13	33	22	0	100

		TRUMP_POLICY_USAID. Do you approve of each of the following? The U.S. ... Ending most U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs								
		TOTAL Approve	TOTAL Disapprove	Strongly approve	Somewhat approve	Somewhat disapprove	Strongly disapprove	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	35	45	22	13	15	30	19	0	100

		EXPAND_GAZA. Donald Trump has mentioned an interest in the U.S. taking over Gaza. How likely do you think it is that Donald Trump will pursue this?								
		Extremely likely	Very likely	Somewhat likely	Not too likely	Not at all likely	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2025	6	13	26	25	12	16	0	100	1804

Asked of Form 1 only.

		EXPAND2_GAZA. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. taking over Gaza, as Donald Trump has proposed?								
		Strongly favor	Somewhat favor	Somewhat oppose	Strongly oppose	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total	N=	
U.S.	Spring, 2025	3	12	13	49	22	0	100	1804	

Asked of Form 1 only.

		EXPAND_GRNLND. Donald Trump has mentioned an interest in the U.S. taking over Greenland. How likely do you think it is that Donald Trump will pursue this?								
		Extremely likely	Very likely	Somewhat likely	Not too likely	Not at all likely	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total	N=
U.S.	Spring, 2025	7	16	28	22	13	14	0	100	1801

Asked of Form 2 only.

		EXPAND2_GRNLND. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. taking over Greenland, as Donald Trump has proposed?								
		Strongly favor	Somewhat favor	Somewhat oppose	Strongly oppose	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total	N=	
U.S.	Spring, 2025	8	15	12	43	22	1	100	1801	

Asked of Form 2 only.

		TARIFFS_COUNTRYNS. Overall, do you think these increased tariffs will be ...?							Total	N=
		Good for the U.S.	Bad for the U.S.	No real effect either way	Not sure	DK/Refused				
U.S.	Spring, 2025	24	52	6	19	0		100	1801	

Asked of Form 2 only.

		TARIFFS_INDIVNS. Overall, do you think these increased tariffs will be ...?							Total	N=
		Good for you personally	Bad for you personally	No real effect either way	Not sure	DK/Refused				
U.S.	Spring, 2025	10	53	17	20	0		100	1801	

Asked of Form 2 only.

		TRUMP_RUSUKR. Thinking about the war between Russia and Ukraine, do you think Donald Trump is ...?					
		Favoring Russia too much	Favoring Ukraine too much	Striking about the right balance	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	43	3	31	22	1	100

		TRUMP_FAVORISRPAL. Do you think U.S. President Donald Trump is ...?					
		Favoring the Israelis too much	Favoring the Palestinians too much	Striking about the right balance	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	31	3	29	37	1	100
	July, 2024	26	3	28	42	1	100

In the July 2024 survey, question asked 'If Donald Trump were to win the 2024 presidential election, do you think he would...?'

U.S. WEB TREND FOR COMPARISON						
		TRUMP_FAVORISRPAL. Do you think U.S. President Donald Trump is ...?				
		Favoring the Israelis too much	Favoring the Palestinians too much	Striking about the right balance	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	April, 2019	34	6	50	10	100

U.S. WEB TREND FOR COMPARISON							
		BIDEN_FAVORISRPAL. Do you think U.S. President Joe Biden is ...?					
		Favoring the Israelis too much	Favoring the Palestinians too much	Striking about the right balance	Not sure	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	July, 2024	21	20	18	40	1	100
	February, 2024	22	16	21	40	1	100
	November, 2023	21	16	25	38	1	100
	Spring, 2022	8	13	16	62	1	100

		U.S. Party ID with Leaners			
		Rep/Lean Rep	Dem/Lean Dem	DK/Refused	Total
U.S.	Spring, 2025	48	48	5	100